Europe’s plan for a “digital Iron Dome” to shield its eastern flank from Russian drones is colliding with bureaucratic gridlock, EU defence chief Andrius Kubilius has warned. The bloc is about to unleash massive defence spending, but is woefully slow.

European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Finland’s defence minister, Antti Häkkänen, struck a note of urgency during a press conference in Copenhagen on 26 September. Both men outlined ambitious plans to counter Russian threats through a “drone wall” along the EU’s eastern borders but warned that bureaucratic inertia risks undermining the bloc’s ability to act swiftly.

“Russia is testing the EU and NATO, and our response must be firm, united, and immediate,” said Mr Kubilius, referencing recent provocations involving Russian drones near Baltic and Black Sea territories. Central to this response is the “Eastern Flank Watch” initiative, a multi-layered defence system combining drone detection, maritime security, and space-based surveillance. The project, developed with input from Ukrainian officials and NATO observers, aims to integrate border control and anti-migration measures with military readiness. Yet Mr Kubilius admitted the EU’s existing financial and regulatory tools are ill-suited for rapid deployment. “We need to turn discussions into concrete actions—yesterday.”

The drone wall—a network of sensors, interceptors, and electronic warfare systems—dominated discussions. Mr Kubilius stressed that current EU capabilities lag behind Ukraine’s battle-tested innovations. “Our systems are good at detecting missiles or aircraft, but small, low-flying drones? We need radars, acoustic sensors, and better integration between national surveillance networks.” He praised Ukraine’s “ecosystem” of drone producers, data analysts, and engineers, noting their ability to adapt when Russians jam systems.

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Red tape causes funding headaches

Finland’s 1,300km border with Russia poses a particular challenge. Mr Häkkänen emphasised that defence planning must balance cost and effectiveness. “Shooting down a €10k drone with a €1m missile isn’t sustainable. We need layered solutions: detection, electronic jamming, and cheaper interceptors.” He acknowledged divergent national systems but insisted regional projects require standardisation.

Mr Kubilius pinned hopes on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), a proposed €1.5bn fund stuck in negotiations. “Regulation is in its concluding stages… we hope to finish by October,” he said. He urged using the EU’s pandemic-era borrowing model to fast-track procurement: “If member states present joint investment plans by November, we could use loans.”

Finland’s €10bn-15bn land-forces reform highlights the gap between national budgets and EU-wide coordination. “We are investing heavily, but drone defence requires a layered approach,” said Mr Häkkänen. When asked if Southern European states would fund Eastern projects, Mr Kubilius cited pandemic solidarity: “Italy, France, Spain took big loans then. Now it’s our turn.”

Timelines, trade-offs, and metaphors

Speed remains a critical concern. Mr Kubilius said technical teams (“Sherpas”) would draft a roadmap within weeks but cautioned that timelines are unrealistic. “Some say the drone wall can be built in a year. I’m not sure,” he stated. He contrasted Ukraine’s rapid battlefield adaptations—where engineers adjust systems weekly to counter Russian jamming—with EU delays. “We lack their ecosystem of producers, data analysts, and battlefield feedback,” he admitted.

Mr Häkkänen stressed Finland’s unique needs. “We’ve planned for missile threats, hybrid attacks, drones. Our integrated system works, but scaling it regionally? That’s the challenge.” He declined to specify Finland’s current drone-intercept capacity, citing operational secrecy, but added: “We have a strong air force. We can defend ourselves.”

Some say the drone wall can be built in a year. I’m not sure. — Andrius Kubilius, European Defence and Space Commissioner

Officials clarified the drone wall is not a physical barrier but a patchwork of national systems. Mr Häkkänen framed it as “denying drones entry, whether near borders or critical infrastructure.” Mr Kubilius warned of broader threats, such as Russia using commercial ships to launch drones near EU ports. “We need protocols for that,” he said.

‘We can’t wait until 2035’

When asked if the project prioritises military over civilian needs, Mr Häkkänen deferred to NATO guidance: “Member states decide their own plans. NATO’s defence concepts will shape priorities.” Mr Kubilius linked defence spending to migration policy: “Every euro spent on border detection eases the migration crisis too. That’s the synergy.”

Both officials pressed for urgent funding. Member states pledged to raise defence spending to three per cent of GDP by 2035—up from 2% today—which Mr Kubilius said would unlock €4.2tn over seven years. “But we need billions now, not in a decade.” He proposed borrowing via the EU’s pandemic recovery fund model: “Why not borrow for defence? Southern Europe did it for healthcare.”

If Eastern Flank Watch becomes another bureaucratic exercise, Russia wins. — Antti Häkkänen, Finland’s defence minister

Mr Häkkänen warned against complacency. “The NATO summit set targets. Now we need implementation. If Eastern Flank Watch becomes another bureaucratic exercise, Russia wins.” Closing the press conference, Mr Kubilius acknowledged the EU’s sluggishness compared to Ukraine’s rapid innovation, where daily battlefield updates drive adaptations. He conceded that the bloc’s lengthy decision-making cycles stand in stark contrast to Kyiv’s urgency.

The drone wall concept

The proposed “drone wall” is not a physical barr ier but a coordinated defence network designed to detect, track, and neutralise unauthorised drones before they breach sensitive airspace. Inspired by missile defence systems like Israel’s Iron Dome, the concept has been tailored to address the unique challenge of small, low-cost drones proliferating across conflict zones. Key components include advanced radar, acoustic sensors, electronic jamming systems, and cost-effective interceptors.

The idea originated in the Baltic states, where Estonia and Lithuania have long pushed for a unified defence system along Europe’s eastern flank. Poland, citing its frontline position against potential incursions, has backed the initiative, urging faster EU-wide coordination. Momentum grew after a series of drone incidents near Danish and Baltic critical infrastructure, prompting EU foreign policy officials to declare: “We cannot wait” to act.

Russian military flights are guided by international rules. — Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman

NATO’s involvement underscores the threat’s alliance-wide significance. A joint NATO-EU ministerial meeting on 27 September will formalise the project’s cross-institutional scope. Meanwhile, Baltic technology firms claim readiness to deploy systems immediately, offering solutions ranging from AI-powered detection platforms to drone-killing microwave emitters.

We will shoot you down

In a related defence development, European diplomats warned Russia this week that NATO will respond forcefully to further airspace violations, Bloomberg reports. These may include shooting down aircraft, officials familiar with closed-door talks in Moscow said. The warning followed a 16 September incursion by three Russian MiG-31 jets into Estonian airspace, which NATO deemed deliberate. Russian officials denied violations, claiming flights adhere to international rules, and dismissed a separate Polish drone breach as accidental. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted: “Russian military flights are guided by international rules.”

At the Moscow meeting, British, French, and German envoys demanded an end to incursions. A Russian diplomat linked the flights to Ukrainian strikes on Crimea, arguing NATO’s support for Kyiv justifies Moscow’s actions. European officials speculated detailed Russian note-taking signaled Kremlin interest in NATO’s red lines.  

If implemented, the drone wall could become Europe’s most significant joint defence initiative since the Cold War.