In July, the European Commission presented the proposal for the Space Act, aimed at regulating space and attempting to draft European rules for the extraterrestrial orbit. Although the parliamentary debate is still at an early stage, the number one goal is harmonization, says MEP Giorgio Gori (S&D/ITA), shadow rapporteur for the file, speaking to EU Perspectives.
It is expected that a first draft by the rapporteur of the ITRE Committee, MEP Elena Donazzan (ECR/ITA), will be ready by January 2026. “Then, we will have room to propose amendments,” Mr Gori explains. The idea is to achieve approval in the ITRE Committee in summer and, in September 2026, to hold the first debate in plenary.
What is the current state of play of the Space Act discussion within the ITRE Committee?
There is a school of thought that considers the regulatory instrument to be excessively prescriptive and would prefer the Commission to proceed through a directive. This is, for example, the position of the Italian government, which I recognize in the words of my colleague from the Conservatives group. Honestly, I do not think there are the conditions to take a step back, nor do I believe it would be right to do so, because the goal of standardizing procedures and access requirements to space is a key factor of the Space Act.
You might be interested
The primary objective of Space Act is to build the single market for the Space Economy, which does not exist today. – MEP Giorgio Gori (S&D/ITA)
Its primary objective is to build the single market for the Space Economy, which does not exist today. At present, there are many national markets—around fifteen countries have already acted autonomously and differently—and we are therefore facing a Babel of provisions that are not compatible with one another. It is therefore all the more necessary, on the contrary, that there be clear prescriptions, avoiding the risk that would be associated with a directive, namely the adoption of divergent and inconsistent national measures. I firmly believe this is the right path.
Then there is an issue of the instrument’s apparent complexity, and we must understand, as we go deeper, whether simplifications are possible. The European Commission has often legislated in a very detailed and prescriptive way, only to later retract part of those provisions through omnibus revisions, of which we have seen several editions. So, in order to avoid having to publish a “Space Act omnibus” a year from now, I would prefer that any simplifications be made immediately. This also seems to be the general sentiment coming from the business world: companies are pleased that a rule will make the European landscape more homogeneous, but they are concerned about having to comply with excessively burdensome obligations. It is difficult to give a preliminary judgment.
Everything that can reasonably be simplified, we will try to simplify – but no more than that. Beyond harmonization, there are three main verticals: security, resilience, and sustainability. My impression is that Commission prescribes certain obligations but leaves them largely to voluntary adherence. Among the three, sustainability is the least mature pillar and therefore not the most essential one. What the Space Act does is prepare the ground for a subsequent, more mature and comprehensive regulation of what “sustainability in space” actually means. Conversely, in my view, the other two pillars are much clearer.
There is the issue of congestion in suborbital space, with an unimaginable amount of debris, and thus an increasingly high risk of collisions and damage to space equipment. It is therefore appropriate that the Commission intervenes by prescribing measures to mitigate this risk and, in perspective, to clean up the suborbital environment. On the other hand, the issue of resilience directly mirrors the question of defense, because satellites move within one of the dimensions in which a modern defense system now operates no longer limited to land or air, but also encompassing underwater domains and outer space itself.
In these environments, attacks of all kinds can occur: attempts to disrupt signals, digital manipulation, and so on. To make space infrastructure more resistant upstream to such risks, specific activities and obligations must be foreseen, to which the actors of the future space economy will have to comply.
What does European space sovereignty mean today? What is the ultimate goal in rewriting these rules?
On sovereignty, there are different and not always aligned visions. The Commission rightly expresses the ambition to establish European sovereignty, meaning that the space environment should be governed by common rules shared by all 27 member states, since there is only one atmosphere and a single set of orbits. It is difficult, in a sense, to reassign portions of those to individual member states.
The space environment should be governed by common rules shared by all 27 member states, since there is only one atmosphere and a single set of orbits. – MEP Giorgio Gori (S&D/ITA)
Obviously, as we come from a period in which each member state was sovereign, in its own territory, even over the space objects it launched into orbit, this attempt to establish a form of federal sovereignty tends to clash with the expectation of some member states to retain more specific or pronounced competences over space activities. In reality, I believe that coexistence between these two levels is possible. Some prerogatives of the member states need not necessarily be relinquished, but there must be common rules shared by all.
And what about the relationship with the United States?
We live in a competitive environment: Europe is objectively competing, and European operators are in competition with non-European ones. Their legitimate concern is that they should not be subject to stricter rules and obligations than those applied to other actors operating on the European market and selling services to European companies or institutions.
It is necessary to define which is the mechanism through which the Commission envisions granting access to the European market to non-European operators. – MEP Giorgio Gori (S&D/ITA)
It therefore becomes important to define concretely what is meant by the principle of equivalence which is the mechanism through which the Commission envisions granting access to the European market to non-European operators, provided that the rules in their home countries are substantially equivalent to those introduced by the Space Act. The concern that this principle of equivalence could, in practice, become an overly broad umbrella under which even operators from more permissive legislative systems might fit is one I have heard from many colleagues working in the Committee.
Without closing the European market which, in my view, would be a mistake, this is an opportunity to build a level playing field in which everyone competes under rules that, if not identical, are at least equivalent. Discussions on principles can align perspectives, but unless we delve into the details, we will not know whether this principle of equivalence is truly acceptable and in Europe’s best interests or not.
I believe it is right that, in drafting such a systemic law, we avoid creating conditions of privilege for some over others. At the same time, competitiveness is not determined by regulation, but by investment capacity. So, setting boundaries will not be enough. If Starlink has a capacity for development, launch, and service delivery one hundred times greater than the most advanced European operator, so be it unfortunately. But given that there is a risk this dynamic may prevail if Europe fails to develop adequate investments, we must at least ensure that there are no regulatory elements that make Starlink’s path easier, to cite the most well-known satellite operator today.
Thus, we should ensure that the rules are neither an element of market closure (I would not agree with that) nor a means of undue facilitation for non-European operators. After that, the competition issue plays out elsewhere in how we spend the funds allocated to the space and defense chapter within the Multiannual Financial Framework.
Are there concerns about the legislative process and harmonization from member states?
In the meetings I have held, I found a rather critical position from the Italian government, specifically regarding the boundary between national and European legislation. When I referred to those who would prefer this to be a directive rather than a regulation, I was referring in particular to our national government. It is clear that this is a sector where some European countries have a very significant industrial presence, France, for instance, which, as happened with European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and defense spending, tends to emphasize that products should be European above a certain percentage. This is because in France, more than in other countries, both defense and space industries are more developed.
However, I do not believe this will become the main reason for debate in Parliament. Perhaps it might arise in the Council but I think that within Parliament we will be able to find alignments. Also because industry, in the meantime, is moving forward: the Leonardo-Thales Alenia-Airbus agreement, in my view, is the real answer to the challenge posed by Elon Musk and the big American players, as well as the Chinese ones, since China too is growing rapidly. It is right to create a framework of rules within which operators can move easily and predictably, but it is not regulation that determines competitiveness or European sovereignty. What matters most is the ability to compete in markets and to develop investment.
From this perspective, it will be very important—in this sector as in many others—for Europe to evolve its antitrust framework. I say this because, based on what has happened in recent years, there has perhaps been excessive focus on consumer rights and on maximizing competition within individual countries, to the detriment of the business scale necessary to compete with global giants. Now, it seems to me that on this point, Draghi, in his report on competitiveness, made very clear statements, and that the Commission appears to be taking them on board.
Therefore, I expect, for instance, that an industrial alliance such as the one I mentioned—Leonardo, Thales Alenia, and Airbus—will not face obstacles from the European Commission on antitrust grounds, as it perhaps would have a few years ago. We are talking about a supranational entity of considerable size, one that does not eliminate competition within Europe since it will obviously not be the only one but that finally gives us a player capable of competing with the world’s major companies.
