The Union sits at an awkward crossroads. Its leaders like to brag about open markets and predictable rules. Yet supply chains now bend to power, not price. Ignacio García Bercero, former European Union trade negotiator, and Niclas Poitiers, senior fellow at Bruegel, survey the dangers in their latest note on economic security.

“The EU needs a balanced strategy to cut reliance on the US and China while improving its capacity to counter coercive economic threats,” warns an article entitled From strategy to doctrine: the next steps for European economic security published by Bruegel, the Brussels-based think-tank. The sentence serves as both diagnosis and marching order.

The authors argue that Europe must walk on two legs at once. It should “combine a medium-term strategy to reduce dependencies on both China and the US in critical areas with the capacity to react in the short term to threats of coercion.” Factories take years to build; retaliation tools must work tomorrow. The authors maintain that only a coherent doctrine can marry speed with stamina.

The word “doctrine” matters. The 2023 communication on economic security bundled every imaginable gadget—export controls, foreign-investment screening, research grants—yet left strategy vague. As the Bruegel article says, the paper “did not clearly define economic security but rather used economic security as an umbrella term for a collection of instruments.” Ambiguity once felt safe. It now feels reckless.

You might be interested

Power shifts

Russia’s assault on Ukraine shattered old assumptions. China’s dominance of battery minerals and rare earths frightens carmakers. America, under President Donald Trump, treats tariffs as toys. “The administration of US President Donald Trump has shown little interest in coordinating action with allies,” laments the Bruegel article. Even a shiny transatlantic accord signed in July 2025 cannot erase memories of past threats.

Messrs Poitiers and García Bercero list four risk buckets: supply-chain vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure, technology security and economic coercion. His first bucket sloshes hardest. Europe buys almost all its gallium, lithium and magnesium from Chinese refiners. It relies on American tankers for liquefied natural gas. It needs Asian foundries for advanced chips. Yet measurement proves tricky. The Bruegel article concedes that “data and analytical challenges make identifying genuine import dependencies very hard.” Re-exports blur origins; substitutes hide until crisis.

Dependence does not run one way. Europe controls choke points of its own. The Netherlands hosts ASML, ruler of extreme-ultraviolet lithography machines. France and Germany lead in aerospace parts. The authors believes that “identifying such chokepoints may be critical if the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument should be deployed.” A precise strike—say, a limit on spare parts—hurts more than a noisy tariff.

Counting what matters

Not every dependency justifies frantic spending. Some gaps disappear if Europe diversifies suppliers; others vanish with strategic stocks. The authors urge policymakers to focus on sectors where interruption would trigger “greatest macro-economic or social impacts.” Semiconductors, batteries and certain pharmaceuticals top the list. Critical raw materials and networked technologies join close behind.

The study also widens the lens. American liquefied natural gas now covers the hole left by Russian pipeline flows. Such comfort comes with risk. The article notes that this new link “should be considered a potential pressure point”. Banks and cloud operators reveal similar leverage. Dollar dominance lets Washington freeze accounts abroad. Silicon Valley monopolies give American firms an inside track on data flows.

Three steps then follow. First, identify threats with numbers, not anecdotes. Second, decide whether Europe can fix the weakness at home or through allies. Third, pick a tool that matches both speed and cost. Grants, loans, joint procurement and defensive rules all have niches. Mixing them indiscriminately invites waste.

Muscle, or theatre?

Industrial policy glitters. Important Projects of Common European Interest promise billions for batteries, chips and hydrogen. The Critical Raw Materials Act fast-tracks mining permits and sets recycling targets. Yet not all experiments succeed. A €10 billion semiconductor plant in Magdeburg stalled. Northvolt, a Swedish battery hopeful, failed after heavy subsidies. As Mr Poitiers dryly puts it, “IPCEIs have not been an unqualified success.”

The relationship between WTO rules and economic security measures (…) must be clarified. — From strategy to doctrine: the next steps for European economic security – Ignacio García Bercero, Niclas Poitiers, Bruegel

Their chief flaw lies in murky selection. Lobbyists hustle national capitals, which then haggle with Brussels. Old champions often beat new challengers. The authors propose stricter filters. A project should pass a double test: Does it reduce a security risk that matters, and can Europe produce competitively? If either answer is no, money should stay in the purse.

Subsidies also tempt protectionists. The Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal flirts with “minimum European content” rules in public contracts. The Bruegel article fears that such clauses “would be incompatible with the EU’s international obligations and could also become a major obstacle to developing partnerships.” Allies will not help if Europe bars their firms from tenders.

Charm is not enough

Trade deals offer subtler insurance. Europe’s network of free-trade agreements stretches across the globe, yet many China-heavy imports face zero tariffs. Hence the authors promote ‘Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships‘. These packages bundle finance, regulation and market access for countries willing to dig, refine or assemble greener goods. If designed well, they spread risk without shuttering trade.

Still, charm alone will not deter coercion. Brussels wrote the Anti-Coercion Instrument to strike back when foreign governments bully a member state. But officials hesitated when China threatened French cognac or Spanish pork, and when America growled about digital taxes. Mr García Bercero worries that “the unwillingness to deploy the ACI raises serious questions about its credibility.” A dormant sword invites prods.

Export controls and investment screening tell a similar story. Rules differ by capital. One government blocks a suspect buyer; its neighbour welcomes the cheque. The Commission wants common lists and early-warning systems. Unity matters: a cartel of twenty-seven cannot let adversaries shop around.

Financial clouds

Banks and servers hide deeper vulnerabilities. Swift, the global messaging network, lies inside American jurisdiction. So do most big cloud firms. The initial European strategy barely addressed finance or data. The authors demand new risk assessments. They also hint at remedies: promote euro clearing, nurture open-source cloud tools and stress-test payment networks. None is a quick win, but delay only widens gaps.

The Commission should accelerate work on the identification of supply-chain choke-points, based on reverse dependencies — Ignacio García Bercero, Niclas Poitiers, Bruegel

Governance must tie loose threads. Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, has appointed Maroš Šefčovič as Trade and Economic Security Commissioner. The authors advise him to chair a high-level project group. That council should rank threats, assign lead directorates and keep score. National ministers need a matching forum inside the Council of the European Union.

Multilateral rules wobble. World Trade Organisation courts groan under appeals; rich members invoke security to dodge verdicts. The Bruegel article suggests an update. Arbitration panels could weigh whether curbs remain “proportionate,” rather than read minds. Meanwhile the Group of Seven may splinter if America shows muscle. Europe should cultivate smaller circles with Britain, Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea.

Checklist for resilience

The paper closes with ten priorities. Fresh studies on digital and financial exposure. A map of European choke points. Medium-term plans for raw materials and cloud redundancy. Faster deployment of the Anti-Coercion law. Joint export-control alerts. Tougher vetting of outbound investment. Rigorous cost-benefit reviews before each subsidy. Respect for trade obligations. Security clauses in all new trade deals. And a yearly ministerial stock-take.

Insurance costs money. It also demands honesty. The Bruegel article reminds readers that “most economic security measures are preventive—an insurance policy to limit the risk of geopolitical tensions harming economic interests.” Overreach could strangle growth or the net-zero transition. Under-reach leaves Europe exposed. Balance, not bravado, must guide choices.

Priorities matter. Chips, critical minerals and networks top the chart. Luxury goods rank lower, though they stir headlines. Policymakers must resist industries that wrap narrow profits in the flag of security. Scarce funds chase greatest losses.

Time matters too. Mines span parliaments, cloud redundancy takes months. Deterrence tools, such as targeted tariffs or licence bans, should stand ready now. The article’s two-track model—react fast, rebuild slowly—still looks right.

Standards over slogans

“Economic security” seduces because it excuses spending and shields incumbents. The authors counter with sharp metrics. The Net-Zero Industry Act already sets “resilience criteria” to curb single-supplier dependence. Extending such clear benchmarks beats improvised quotas. Market players then know where to invest.

Doctrine, distilled, boils down to three verbs: measure, hedge, deter. Measure exposure with honest data. Hedge by mixing local production and wider alliances. Deter with credible, proportionate penalties. Europe holds the tools; only will is short.

The EU will need to stay decoupled from Russia economy for as long as it represents a threat. — Ignacio García Bercero, Niclas Poitiers, Bruegel

Barriers remain. Consultation culture slows Brussels. National egos resist cession of power. Yet rivals press harder. The Bruegel article warns that “the Union must also be ready to respond to threats of coercion.” Deterrence starts in the mind. If partners doubt Europe’s resolve, they will test it.

Risks without borders

Russia will menace for years; China will weaponise mineral markets; America may slap tariffs on a whim. None of these threats cancels trade’s benefits. But each argues for thicker padding. Mr García Bercero and Mr Poitiers give Brussels a map. Politicians must follow the compass.

Execution beats rhetoric. Decide which gaps deserve public funds today. Publish thresholds that trigger the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Reject glamour projects that fail cost tests. Allies and adversaries alike will notice the difference.

The next crisis may strike without warning. Gallium quotas, chip bans, asset freezes—each would echo across factories. A coherent European doctrine, rooted in data and discipline, will not prevent all shocks. It will, however, tilt outcomes in Europe’s favour.

Europe once trusted rules to tame power. Now it must blend rules with power of its own. The Bruegel authors chart the blend. Their message is stern but not grim. With clear goals, selective subsidies and firm partnerships, the Union can stay both open and safe. History, and voters, will judge whether it acts in time.