Europe has just witnessed a series of elections which, at first glance, appear to confirm the continuing rise of the far right. A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced picture. Radical forces are gaining ground, but when it really counts, they run up against clear limits. Meanwhile, pro-European and centrist groups continue to show they can hold power—and, crucially—govern.
In France, Sunday’s second round of municipal elections highlighted the dual trend. The far right—chiefly represented by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally—failed, according to preliminary results, to take control of major cities across the board. Yet significantly expanded its presence and achieved local breakthroughs. In several regions and municipalities, it successfully mobilised voters and increased its vote share compared with 2020.
This suggests a gradual ‘normalisation’ of its influence, taking root even at levels traditionally dominated by moderate forces. “Never before has the National Rally and its allies had so many elected officials across France,” the party leader, Jordan Bardella, told journalists.
Tactical voting works
At the same time, it was once again evident that such support does not easily translate into executive power. In many instances, the so-called republican front—a tactical alliance of rival parties aimed at blocking the far right—proved decisive. Marseille offered a textbook example. The withdrawal of a left-wing candidate helped consolidate votes in favour of the Socialist Benoît Payan.
A similar dynamic played out in Paris, where the conservative candidate Rachida Dati failed to defeat the Socialist Emmanuel Grégoire. He benefited from the backing of a broader centrist-left bloc. Édouard Philippe, an ex-prime minister and a potential presidential contender next year, projected to win in Le Havre, concluded: “We have reason to hope when all people of good faith come together in a message of truth and reject extremism and its easy answers.”
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A much tighter contest unfolded in Slovenia. In parliamentary elections, the pro-European prime minister Robert Golob (Freedom Movement) narrowly defeated the nationalist Janez Janša (Slovenian Democratic Party) by less than one percentage point—28.62 to 27.95 per cent.
The absence of a clear governing majority points to complex coalition negotiations and the likelihood of a fragile executive. This alone constraints the country’s ability to pursue stable policies, both domestically and within the EU. At the same time, the result confirms that voters ultimately favoured continuity and a pro-European orientation.
A referendum on democracy
The election carried a strong ideological undertone. Mr Golob himself framed the outcome as a vote for democracy. His camp had long warned against a drift towards an ‘illiberal’ model along Hungarian lines. In effect, the vote functioned as a referendum on the character of the state. And although the nationalist right achieved a historically strong result, it failed to persuade a sufficient share of voters to take power. The outcome, however, reflects the deep polarisation of a small country of just 2.1 million people.
Austrian press agency APA nevertheless noted that the real winner may be the pro-Russian, anti-European and populist party Resnica (The Truth). It entered parliament for the first time with more than five per cent of the vote.
ExPM Janša—an admirer of US President Donald Trump and an ally of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—has indicated that he intends to challenge the result, insisting on a recount of “every vote from every polling station”.
Denmark: Will Trump decide the election?
Traditional domestic issues have been pushed into the background ahead of Tuesday’s parliamentary elections in Denmark, with geopolitics taking centre stage. Pressure from the US over Greenland—and Mr Trump’s aggressive foreign policy in general—provided the catalyst.
Denmark is adapting to a new world order. — Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark’s ex-prime minister
This has fundamentally reshaped perceptions of security among both voters and political elites. Questions of defence, sovereignty and Denmark’s international alignment now dominate the campaign more than the economy or the welfare state. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen seized on the moment: she called the snap election, presenting herself as a crisis leader capable of navigating an uncertain world.
Notably, in Denmark—traditionally cautious towards the EU—mainstream euroscepticism appears to be receding, accompanied by a shift towards deeper European integration. Across the political spectrum, positions on security, foreign policy and even economic coordination are converging, narrowing the space for radical or anti-EU alternatives. “Denmark is adapting to a new world order,” said Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former liberal prime minister and former NATO secretary general.
Euro and nuclear weapons
Proposals have emerged to adopt the euro (rejected by Danish voters in a 2000 referendum) or to pursue closer coordination within the EU. These ideas would have been politically difficult to imagine only a few years ago. The EU is increasingly seen not as a constraint on sovereignty, but as a means of reinforcing it. A symbolic step in this direction is Denmark’s willingness to cooperate with France on nuclear deterrence, marking a significant departure from its historic opposition to nuclear weapons.
Despite this profound transformation, the election is unlikely to produce a dramatic political rupture. On foreign and security policy, a broad consensus prevails across the political spectrum. Ms Frederiksen remains the favourite, albeit a weakened one, and is likely to face a fragmented parliament. “Although she will win, she will come out bruised,” said Lykke Friis, a director of Copenhagen-based Think Tank Europa.
In Germany, the tune was different. The outcome of the Sunday’s regional election in Rhineland-Palatinate represents a moment that could significantly affect the federal government’s reform ambitions. The conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by chancellor Friedrich Merz, secured a strong victory with 31 per cent. “It’s historic — a great result for us,” said Jens Spahn, leader of the CDU’s parliamentary group in the Bundestag.
Germany: Bittersweet victory
But in doing so, CDU weakened its coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD). The SPD has suffered yet another electoral setback. It may deepens its internal crisis and diminishing its capacity to support planned reforms in the welfare state, pensions and healthcare.
It’s a bittersweet victory for Merz. — Andreas Busch, University of Göttingen.
The weakness of the SPD—led by Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil and Labour Minister Bärbel Bas—has broader implications than coalition stability alone. The party finds itself at a crossroads between a leftward shift and a pragmatic centrist course. The heavy loss is likely to weaken Mr Klingbeil’s intraparty leadership position. In the context of Germany’s economic challenges, from pressure by Chinese competition to US tariffs and rising energy prices, it heightens the risk of political paralysis.
“It’s a bittersweet victory for Merz,” said Andreas Busch, professor of political sciences at the University of Göttingen. “He needed an electoral boost after (a recent loss in) Baden-Württemberg, but he also needs a functioning coalition. That might have just made things worse.”
AfD doubled the share
At the same time, the far right, particularly Alternative for Germany (AfD), continues to gain ground. The party more than doubled its share of the vote to 19.5 per cent. This reflects growing dissatisfaction among segments of the electorate even in traditionally stable regions.
From a European perspective, it points to a potential weakening of Germany’s role as a driver of reform and integration. Unlike Denmark, this is not a question of a major geopolitical pivot, but rather of domestic political uncertainty that may hinder Berlin’s ability to actively advance deeper European cooperation.
Should the SPD adopt a confrontational stance towards Mr Merz’s reform agenda, Germany may become increasingly preoccupied with internal disputes rather than European initiatives. The result thus indirectly suggests that the future direction of the EU will depend not only on the willingness to integrate, but also on the stability of its key member states.
