Half a million undocumented migrants in Spain may soon gain legal status –- a bold move that resonates with the rest of the EU, which takes a more reserved stance toward migrants. According to analyst Francesco Pasetti, this step offers an alternative approach to migration governance. Could it change the European debate on migration?
On February 10, the measure was at the center of a heated debate in the plenary of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where MEPs and the European Commission discussed the potential implications of Spain’s large-scale regularisation for the Schengen Area and EU migration policy.
For EU Perspectives, Francesco Pasetti, Research Fellow at Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), analyzes the political and structural motivations behind the Spanish government’s decision policies and the EU impact on it.
The debate highlighted tensions between member states’ sovereignty over residence permits and the broader impact that national decisions of this scale can have across the Union.
Specifically, the government led by Pedro Sánchez announced the coming approval of an extraordinary decree that could allow around 500,000 undocumented individuals to obtain a residence and work permit, subject to specific conditions of residency and integration.
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Migration is an extremely polarized political topic. How could Sánchez act so countercurrent and not “upset” anyone within Spain’s political and leadership circles?
The fact that it was approved via royal decree and not through parliamentary debate is indicative that even in Spain, the discussion is polarized and highly politicized. It probably would have been impossible to pass through the traditional parliamentary route. So an executive measure was an obvious solution to these problems.
It was possible because there was backing demonstrated by the popular legislative initiative – the support from Spanish society. Spain has a tradition, and I still think Spanish society views migration more as an opportunity than a problem. Although this perception has changed and worsened in recent years. Migration is generally seen more positively.
The problematic question is: if the migrants weren’t needed, what would we do? Expel them all or let them die at sea?
Still, there are clear advantages that go beyond the mere recognition of migrants’ rights. The Spanish labor market needs workers, and migrants play key roles in crucial sectors of the economy.
These sectors often rely on irregular labor, so regularising these workers provides fiscal gains, ensures greater rights, and brings informal labor into legality, which also reduces criminality. So socially, there are only benefits.
And the alternative? Forced returns are often impracticable without violating the law or constitutionally guaranteed rights and/or unfeasible in practice for technical and operational constraints. Therefore, from a programmatic perspective, this is also much more effective than other approaches.
I think it’s important and I believe this is part of Sánchez’s reasoning and the Spanish government’s to open an alternative to the anti-migration drift that is proliferating somewhat unreasonably, in the rational sense of the word, in Europe and across the West.
Why does Sánchez’s model work in Spain? Are there other EU countries likely to follow Spain’s initiative or have similar conditions for regularisation?
Unfortunately, I see few possibilities for a similar measure in other countries, for several reasons. I would highlight the influence of the far-right and their anti-migration discourse. But also centrist and center-right parties, and even parts of the left, because this sentiment is increasingly affecting all political spectra in Member State parliaments.
Spain, in this sense, is somewhat an exception due to its ideological and political positioning: the government is formed, albeit somewhat unstable and precarious, by center-left and left-wing parties.
Also, Spanish society has a particularly positive sensitivity toward migration, due to the country’s history as a country of emigration, its relations with Latin America, its proximity to Africa, and other historical and cultural factors.
That said, in other countries, for example Italy, where discourse on immigration is much more restrictive, often openly racist, there are also open measures, which are not regularisations but point to the same direction.
For instance, to remain in Italy, the last Italian Decreto Flussi allowed the entry of 500,000 foreigners – numbers comparable to Spain’s measure in terms of volume.
How much of this political move for regularisation is “utilitarian” regarding the narrative of the labor shortage – and how much has a political value?
It’s an argument with a utilitarian basis, which I recognize, but I don’t fully agree with. I don’t think it should be the main reason to justify a policy like this. But the fact is that migrants are needed for the economy, the welfare state, and Spanish and European society.
The problematic question is: if they weren’t needed, what would we do? Expel them all or let them die at sea? I think the reflection should go beyond mere utilitarianism.
In other countries, for example Italy, where discourse on immigration is much more restrictive, often openly racist, there are also open measures, which are not regularisations but point to the same direction.
Unfortunately, in the current political context, it’s a lever to play with, especially in political negotiations and with certain actors and stakeholders, who are defending their interests.
From a pragmatic perspective, if a utilitarian argument helps build consensus and alliances to approve measures that expand rights and improve quality, it should be welcomed.
What I don’t think is correct is to justify these measures solely on an economic utilitarian basis. In Spain, it wasn’t done just for that. There is also a very important rights-based component and a political component at the symbolic and programmatic level: a desire to open an alternative way of thinking about migration governance.
Was it unexpected political move or is there a process that Sánchez – and various stakeholders – have been building over time?
I would say both, meaning that there isn’t a strict, linear path from the government’s side. The outcome of this measure, taken at this specific moment and through a decree, is the result, from the government’s point of view, of a very precise political contingency: reconciling certain power balances both inside and outside the majority, with its main governing partner, Sumar, but also with those who supported the investiture, such as Junts, for other issues ranging from the approval of the national budget – to the delegation of immigration powers to Catalonia.
They needed to mend some of these balances. In part, this decree addresses these political equilibrium needs within the government majority and with the partners who had supported the investiture.
From the government’s perspective, there is also an external factor related to the context, which will soon change with the implementation of the new Migration and Asylum Pact, which has a strongly securitarian and restrictive component.
In this sense, this regularisation closes the door to potential domestic translations of the Pact’s security-driven approach, establishing a barrier against possible drifts toward exclusion and persecution within Spanish society. But I believe – and I think this is the most important aspect to highlight – that the key element is the process you mentioned, which is connected to a popular legislative initiative, the so-called Regularización Ya.
It was presented years ago with the support of all social actors: from migrant associations to Catholic organisations; from trade unions to employers’ associations; and by nearly all parliamentary groups – at least initially – with the exception of VOX.
This popular legislative initiative did not proceed through Parliament at the time, but it created social backing and legitimacy that eventually supported the approval of a decree, years later, which nonetheless rests on these foundations.
