The rare earths in question are called dysprosium and terbium, and the big picture is both prosaic and disturbing. The Union has sharply condemned Myanmar’s ruling junta. Unfortunately, it is the junta that supplies Europe—via Beijing—with materials the bloc sorely needs to quench its own green thirst.

Europe chose indignation to mark a grim milestone. Five years after Myanmar’s generals overturned the ballot box, the European Union published a pointed reprimand that spared no detail. “We condemn the continuing grave human rights violations, which persist alongside widespread restrictions on fundamental freedoms and a climate of fear,” declared the statement, released on 1 February. Officials stressed that the bloc, already Myanmar’s largest humanitarian donor, would tighten sanctions and channel more aid.

The timing sharpened the message. On 25 January the junta staged elections from which millions of voters were barred and most opposition parties banned. Brussels dismissed the spectacle as a masquerade and reminded the regime that over 16 million citizens now need relief. “The European Union stands in solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their aspiration to democracy and peace,” the text concluded.

Strategic metals

Since the coup, the generals have largely ignored foreign rebukes. Fighting with ethnic militias has spread to half the country and refugees have spilled across borders.

The coup leaders, craving legitimacy, received condemnation. “The prevailing context and the implementation of the process made clear that the essential elements of free and fair elections were not met, namely a credible transparent and inclusive process, in line with international standards,” the EU observed.

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But the solidarity carries a cost. Rare-earth magnets found in every European wind turbine, robot and electric car begin their journey in Myanmar’s scarred hills.

A diplomatic dilemma

War has also poisoned the land. Acid leaching of ore ruins water tables, while militia checkpoints siphon profits to gunrunners. “The humanitarian situation remains dire, with over 16 million people in urgent need of assistance,” the EU reminded donors. Relief trucks now navigate battle lines and landslides; cash transfers often vanish before reaching hungry families.

The humanitarian situation remains dire, with over 16 million people in urgent need of assistance. — Statement by Kaja Kallas, High Representative on behalf of the EU  

None of this deters European diplomats from preaching virtue. But it does expose a dilemma now coursing through ministries of trade and energy.

Europe’s clean-tech boom depends on obscure elements with unlovely names. “Europe’s industries need rare earths, and not just for the green transformation,” explains a study by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a German think-tank. The same authors warn of geological scarcity at home: “However, the continent only has a few deposits of rare earths, which have not yet been mined – the impact on the climate and environment is enormous, and the processes are complex.”

Dirty ore, dear prices

China dominates processing yet itself lacks enough heavy rare earths to feed its smelters. For those it turns south. “The civil war-torn country, which has been in a permanent crisis since a military coup in 2021, is the global market leader in the mining of the so-called heavy rare earth dysprosium and terbium,” the paper notes. Last year Chinese buyers lugged 41,700 tonnes across jungle crossings, more than twice China’s own output.

“China and Myanmar are therefore indispensable in the supply chain, as dysprosium and terbium are essential components of so-called permanent magnets,” the think-tank concludes. Over 95 per cent of electric cars use such magnets. In 2024 Germany imported more of them from China than any other country. Demand will soar as Brussels chases its net-zero pledge.

Extraction blights the Kachin uplands. “The resulting contamination endangers rivers, soil, and groundwater – and thus the livelihoods and health of many people,” the study reports. Until recently junta-friendly militias taxed the pits and funnelled cash to Naypyidaw. At the end of 2024 the Kachin Independence Army captured most mines, halted exports and hiked duties once trade resumed. “Although trade has now resumed, the price of terbium has risen significantly by more than 21 percent,” the think-tank records.

Policy tangle

The spike jolted European manufacturers. Assembly lines for motors and wind-turbine nacelles cannot function without a steady trickle of dysprosium. Two months of shipment delays would rattle battery gigafactories from Catalonia to Saxony. Brussels repeats its mantra of ‘de-risking‘ from Beijing, yet no Western refinery can match Chinese scale before the decade ends.

Those who know their supply chains can manage risks better — be it through diversification or targeted influence on local standards. — Heinrich Böll Stiftung study on Myanmar

Germany illustrates the bind. A 2023 Supply-Chain Due-Diligence Act forces big firms to trace human-rights hazards. Some politicians now deem the rule red tape, but advocates retort that it misstates the issue. “Those who know their supply chains can manage risks better — be it through diversification or targeted influence on local standards.” Brussels drafts a continent-wide law of its own, though lobbyists hunt for loopholes.

Ethical sourcing alone will not calm markets. The junta could still throttle ore sales if it seeks hard currency or diplomatic leverage. Activists urge Europe to engage the Kachin rebels, who promise cleaner mining. Yet dealing with non-state armies would anger Myanmar’s neighbours and breach EU sanctions lore. Officials therefore rely on indirect pressure: they whisper to Chinese magnet firms that price shocks jeopardise contracts, and to ASEAN diplomats that peace will keep minerals flowing.

Uncomfortable arithmetic

Europe’s green revolution cannot pause for Myanmar’s agony. Brussels may denounce generals in every communiqué, but factories still need magnets. “Technological progress must not come at the expense of the environment and human rights in countries of the Global South such as Myanmar,” the foundation‘s study urges. That hope clashes with reality in the mud of Kachin.

For now the EU clings to principle while scouring the globe for substitutes. Recycling schemes advance and Greenland eyes open-pit mines. None will fill the gap soon. The fifth anniversary of the coup thus leaves Europe preaching values it struggles to uphold, tethered by supply chains that run from Brussels boardrooms to jungle sluices and back again.