When tens of thousands crossed from Morocco into Ceuta in late July, a second wave followed online. Two Moroccan human rights groups tracked how posts and videos turned individual incidents into hate against an entire nation. They tell EU Perspectives what the EU should do about it.
Digital spaces and border spaces can no longer be analysed separately. Images and accounts from Ceuta fuelled a cycle in which events on the ground and online content amplified each other. That content helped turn individual incidents into accusations against an entire national community.
Since 29 July, two Moroccan organisations have been monitoring the crossings into Ceuta: the Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (IPDDH) and the Civil Council for the Fight Against All Forms of Discrimination (CCLD). They track human rights, discrimination, and hate speech. They also follow the protection of vulnerable people, institutional responses, and media coverage.
The groups argue that the EU should use the Digital Services Act (DSA) to “prevent illegal content, incitement to violence, and manipulative practices that threaten fundamental rights”. The Union, they add, “must accept its share of responsibility for the consequences of its policies aimed at securing its external borders”.
What have you documented about the rise of anti-Moroccan hate speech online since the Ceuta crisis?
Our first monitoring report is based on an analysis of 1,245 posts, videos, and comments collected between 29 July and 31 July 2026, across five digital platforms: X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. The monitoring framework also encompassed media content and statements disseminated in Spanish, Italian, French, Arabic, and English.
The content examined revealed several manifestations of hostility: racist and xenophobic remarks, dehumanising comments, and broad generalisations targeting people of Moroccan origin. It also revealed sexist expressions—specifically directed at women and girls—based on their appearance, attire, or perceived morality.
A particularly concerning issue is the tendency to generalise the behaviour or actions of specific individuals to an entire population, based on nationality, actual or assumed origin, or cultural background. Such discourse fosters a climate of suspicion and serves to legitimise discriminatory attitudes.
Our monitoring also focused on how images, videos, and comments circulating online amplified tensions, particularly when such content was shared without sufficient context or verification of its authenticity. The discourse that emerged in the context of the events in Ceuta sometimes goes beyond criticising a specific situation, evolving instead into forms of collective stigmatisation of Moroccan people.
Which narratives about Moroccans and migrants have been most widespread online?
Several recurring narratives have emerged from our monitoring efforts. The first involves framing those who crossed the border into Ceuta as a collective threat to security, public order, and social cohesion. In this way, individual situations are generalised to entire groups, fuelling a negative perception of people of Moroccan origin and, more broadly, of North African populations.
A second register is rooted in dehumanisation, manifested through racist remarks, insults, and degrading portrayals. This is compounded by Islamophobic and sexist rhetoric, including comments targeting women and girls based on their appearance, attire, or origin.
The episode involving allegations of scabies is particularly telling. We observed the circulation of content linking those who crossed the border to scabies and other health issues, at times drawing a direct connection between their presence and a public health risk.
We also paid close attention to how certain individual accounts become part of online debates where people’s personal journeys and motivations are subjected to judgments that are, at times, exceptionally hostile. This type of situation, in particular, reveals how a woman’s testimony becomes a pretext for sexist attacks, degrading comments, and generalisations about Moroccan women and the society from which they come.
We have also identified content that trivialises and justifies the use of violence and degrading treatment, including against unaccompanied minors. We have identified rhetoric that challenges the legitimacy of humanitarian aid, access to healthcare, and the protection of vulnerable individuals.
What is particularly concerning is the convergence of these narratives: the individuals targeted are portrayed, in turn, as a security threat, a public health issue, or a burden on the community. This cumulative effect serves to cast them as an undesirable group and has fostered the normalisation of discriminatory behaviour toward them.
Have you identified coordinated campaigns or disinformation behind this content?
Yes. Our monitoring efforts have uncovered concerning signs that hostile rhetoric is being structured and amplified, alongside several instances of disinformation or misleading content. Specifically, we have identified Instagram pages that appeared to have specialised in disseminating hate speech and content targeting individuals who had crossed the border.
Some posts went beyond merely commenting on the events; they delved into the pasts or personal accounts of the young people involved, revealing photographs and details from their previous lives to argue that they had lived comfortably, travelled, or otherwise had no reason to leave. This approach served to publicly expose these individuals, subject their personal journeys to collective judgment, and delegitimise their situation by using personal information taken out of context.
We also observed a concerning link between the rhetoric spread online and mobilisations in the public sphere. Certain demonstrations, framed as gatherings in support of Ceuta, featured slogans hostile toward migrants. More alarmingly, groups associated with the far right, such as Núcleo Nacional, appeared on the streets in the immediate aftermath of the crossings. Given the high level of tension, this presence raised fears that hate speech could escalate into acts of intimidation or violence.
These observations suggest that we are not dealing merely with spontaneous, individual reactions. — IPDDH and CCLD, Moroccan human rights organisations
These observations suggest that we are not dealing merely with spontaneous, individual reactions. The existence of pages that repeatedly disseminate hostile content, the targeting of identifiable individuals, and the convergence between online rhetoric and street-level mobilisations are indicators that warrant an investigation into potential mechanisms of coordination and amplification.
Crucially, this content did more than just express hostility toward those who crossed the border; it was designed to expose and discredit these individuals, while legitimising their rejection within the public sphere. The combination of digital targeting, hate speech, and the presence of far-right groups on the streets served as a particularly serious warning sign regarding the risks to the safety and fundamental rights of the individuals concerned.
Our monitoring also focused on the role of certain media outlets in amplifying these narratives. Some programmes hosted guests whose positions revealed a marked hostility toward Morocco and who employed highly alarmist language invoking concepts such as “hybrid warfare”, “invasion”, the instrumentalisation of people, and violence. The repeated use of this vocabulary helped frame these events as an intentional threat directed against Spain.
It is important to recognise that by invoking the rhetoric of war and threat, certain media discourses can heighten feelings of vulnerability among the Spanish population. They can also fuel distrust toward migrants and encourage the spread of hostile messages on social media.
The challenge, therefore, lies in understanding how specific narratives are constructed, adopted, and legitimised by media figures, only to be further disseminated across the digital landscape and within public demonstrations. This convergence warrants examination as part of the mechanisms that amplify hate and disinformation.
What concrete action should the EU take to address this phenomenon?
The European Union should shift from a primarily reactive approach to a strategy focused on prevention and accountability, especially when migration-related situations lead to a rapid surge in racist and xenophobic discourse. We recommend: first, strengthen the detection and handling of hateful content. Platforms should have procedures in accessible, rapid, and effective reporting channels, particularly for content in Arabic, French, and Spanish. Platforms should also explain the follow-up actions taken in response to reports submitted by specialised civil society organisations.
Secondly, a specific response should be established for instances where a migration-related event triggers a surge in hate speech or disinformation. Platforms, national authorities, fact-checking organisations, and civil society should be able to activate a rapid cooperation mechanism, rather than waiting for the situation to escalate.
Individuals targeted online must be protected offline. — IPDDH and CCLD
Thirdly, individuals targeted online must be protected offline. Measures to combat online hate must be integrated with mechanisms for reporting threats, addressing discrimination, and providing support to victims, with particular attention given to minors and other vulnerable individuals.
Fourthly, there must be investment in prevention and media literacy. The response cannot rely solely on the removal of content; it must also encompass rapid fact-checking, raising awareness about racist discourse, and promoting narratives that acknowledge the dignity of migrants.
Finally, the EU should ensure that its migration policies, partnerships with neighbouring countries, and public communications do not contribute, even indirectly, to the normalisation of rhetoric that equates migration with criminality and collective threat. The objective is not to restrict legitimate debate on migration policies, but to ensure that such debate does not serve as a justification for hate, discrimination, or violence.
Is the DSA sufficient to tackle hate speech and disinformation during migration crises, or are stronger EU tools needed?
The Digital Services Act represents a significant step forward. But its effectiveness depends on its practical implementation, the authorities’ ability to enforce its obligations, and cooperation with independent stakeholders.
The regulation notably establishes enhanced obligations for very large online platforms regarding the assessment and mitigation of systemic risks, as well as a crisis response mechanism. It also addresses risks associated with the spread of disinformation.
However, it does not itself define every category of illegal content; such definitions are primarily determined by existing European law and applicable national legislation. The situation involving the border crossing at Ceuta demonstrates that a general legal framework must be supported by operational mechanisms capable of addressing sudden, cross-border, and multilingual events.
We therefore advocate not so much for an indiscriminate proliferation of new legal texts, but rather for the strengthening of existing ones. These should be complemented by targeted measures: European rapid-response protocols for addressing surges in hate speech during crises; more precise risk assessments concerning recommendation algorithms and the virality of content; structured cooperation with civil society, including organisations based in countries neighbouring the European Union; and mechanisms for oversight, redress, and accountability. Any additional measures must, however, safeguard freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the right to information.
