The EU–US Turnberry trade framework was sold as a pragmatic win — a floor on tariffs, a moment of stability. Ten months in, the economics have not held up and the political premise has collapsed. For leading economists, the question was never whether it would hold, but why Brussels agreed to it at all.
“This makes no sense,” says Bernard Hoekman, Director of Global Economics at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. “How could it make sense that we accept one of our largest trading partners basically unilaterally increasing tariffs against us to an average of 15%? In what world does that make sense for us?”
EY’s March 2026 forecast estimates tariffs will shave 0.5 percentage points off EU GDP growth this year. The European Central Bank’s March projections are equally sobering. The bank expects export growth to stay subdued and projects further losses in euro area export market share, even with the lower tariff rate.
A deal built on avoiding disaster
ING’s economic research acknowledges the deal brings “greater clarity and predictability.” In the most favourable modelling, it is worth something only because the alternative was tariffs of 30 per cent or worse. The case for it rests entirely on avoiding a worse outcome, not on generating any economic benefit of its own.
“The signal we’re now sending is: if you’re big enough, we might give you preferential access independent of a trade agreement. We’ve given the US concessions that don’t make a whole lot of difference economically, when we could have just said we’re going to remove all of our industrial tariffs unilaterally,” Mr Hoekman says.
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Everybody recognises that with this administration, essentially nothing is worth the paper it’s written on.
—Bernard Hoekman, Director of Global Economics, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The predictability argument was already fragile. It has since collapsed. The United States has waged a war on Iran, pushing Europe towards a potential recession. Washington has also violated the premise of the trade agreement at least three times since July last year. “Everybody recognises that with this administration, essentially nothing is worth the paper it’s written on,” Mr Hoekman says.
Looking beyond Washington
Europe’s best hope lies in the plurilateral track, says Mr Hoekman. That means issue-specific cooperation with coalitions of like-minded partners on supply chain resilience, digital standards, and economic security. One model is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Against expectations, it has survived the Trump administration’s return. “The focus tends to be relentlessly bilateral, and we really need to get out of that mode,” he says.
For Mr Hoekman, the bottom line is simple: “The best way to look at the EU–US trade deal is as a damage limitation exercise.” Trilogue negotiations are now underway with a second round scheduled for May 6, with France and the European Parliament pushing for safeguards to which a German-led Council majority is resisting.
