Europe cannot count on dramatic changes in Tel Aviv’s post-election course. For Israelis, it is business as usual: change is in sight, but out of reach.

The Israelites were famously chosen as God’s favourite people, but choosing is not their descendants’ forte. In politics today, even the simple art of choosing a leader seems to elude them. The Holy Land votes as though it were a job. Tuesday’s election was the seventh in as many years that Israelis have trooped to the polls. Yet their choices rarely produce clear winners, let alone stable governments.

God, who is otherwise in the agonising habit of biding His time, retaliates swiftly: He keeps returning Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister. The merciless routine has run, with minor interruptions, for thirty years.

Whether that pattern holds or breaks was at stake in the election. True to form, no clear winner emerged, according to preliminary results released in the small hours of Wednesday. Likud, the prime minister’s right-wing party, won 27 seats in the Knesset, more than any other party. But Mr Netanyahu and his likely coalition partners can muster only about 50 seats, well short of the 61 needed for a majority, and far below the 68 they hold now.

Two rivals, one stalemate

Yashar, the largest opposition party, is led by Gadi Eisenkot, Mr Netanyahu’s chief rival. It won 21 seats. Together with the other opposition parties, who are united chiefly by their wish to depose Mr Netanyahu, it reaches a total of between 48 and 52, depending on how analysts rate Yashar’s coalition potential. The roughly 20 remaining seats will tip the balance.

Both men have claimed partial victories. The prime minister stressed that Likud remains Israel’s largest party; Mr Eisenkot insists that the country voted for change. Both claims may be technically correct, and neither carries any real weight.

Israel’s hard-right shift goes far beyond the prime minister, and Europeans should prepare for more continuity than they would like. — Beth Oppenheim, European Council for Foreign Relations

Mr Eisenkot is not shy about his ambitions. “I will act immediately to carry out the people’s mandate, replace Netanyahu’s government and form a Zionist government committed to military conscription as soon as possible,” he said. Europe, watching from afar, has reason to listen closely.

Mr Netanyahu has answered in kind. Asked about a possible defeat, he warned: “The next government would be made up of ‘the left’ and Arab parties, a copy of what is happening in Europe.” Europe, in other words, is already part of the argument.

A fight with a European audience

It is also a large part of Israel’s life. The EU describes a relationship that spans security cooperation, trade, research, energy, and political dialogue. That breadth explains why a change of leader in Jerusalem matters in Brussels.

For EU policymakers, the key question is therefore not only who becomes prime minister. It is whether the next government changes its conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, acts against settler violence, and clarifies its approach to Russia.

The legal framework is the EU–Israel Association Agreement. It makes respect for human rights and democratic principles an essential element of the relationship. Brussels can therefore argue that its criticism is not meddling, but a matter of contract. Israeli governments, of either stripe, tend to see it differently.

The likely difference between the two men is less about whether Israel stays a close security partner. It is about how much political friction surrounds the partnership. Mr Netanyahu would probably continue the present pattern. Mr Eisenkot could offer a reset — but a limited one.

The defence question

If Mr Netanyahu stays, practical cooperation would probably continue, with more political strain around it. EU member states do not all take the same view of Israel, and action by the bloc as a whole has faced political obstacles, to put it mildly.

Yet disputes can turn into concrete pressure. The EU has reviewed the Association Agreement and adopted sanctions connected to settler violence. That creates reputational and political risks for defence cooperation. Individual European governments may still keep their bilateral ties, but they would do so under a louder protest.

It is either me and Trump or Eisenkot and Abbas. — Benjamin Netanjahu, Israel’s prime minister

Mr Eisenkot offers continuity where it counts. His military background and security-centred platform suggest the same priority for readiness, and for threats from Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. He is no dove. Europe should not expect a different defence posture.

What he could change is conduct. Mr Eisenkot’s party has called for stronger American and French involvement in Lebanon. That could open the way to closer consultation with European partners. But his approach remains security-oriented. His stated positions do not amount to a general shift away from force-based policy. The likely difference between the two men lies less in what Israel defends than in how it behaves towards those who help defend it.

Gaza and the diplomatic temperature

A Netanyahu victory would probably preserve a familiar routine. Israel would court individual European governments while relations with EU institutions stay strained. The main sources of friction would be the war in Gaza, the expansion of settlements, and violence in the West Bank.

An Eisenkot government might lower the temperature. It could do so by pursuing a more credible arrangement for postwar Gaza, by allowing a larger international role, or by acting more firmly against settler violence. Each step would give Brussels something to welcome rather than condemn.

Reporting on his platform says he would consider a role for Palestinian Authority-linked technocratic leaders and international peacekeepers in Gaza, while Israel retained its security arrangements. Such ideas could give European governments more room to engage. They are, however, a long way from a political settlement.

They are also not an embrace of statehood. Mr Eisenkot opposes a Palestinian state. The EU’s longer-term position on a two-state settlement could therefore still collide with Israeli policy. The distinction between the men looks more like one of style and manageability than of substance.

Moscow and Washington

Russia offers another test. Mr Netanyahu’s government has pursued a pragmatic relationship with Moscow. It has kept channels open and declined to align fully with Western sanctions and military support for Ukraine. That has sometimes put Israel at odds with the EU.

Mr Eisenkot’s record is thinner. The public material cited here does not set out a detailed Russia policy. Closer alignment with Washington and European governments is plausible, especially if he wanted to rebuild Israel’s standing in the West. But that is a forecast, not a promise.

I will (…) replace Netanyahu’s government and form a Zionist government committed to military conscription as soon as possible. — Gadi Eisenkot, Israeli opposition leader

Then there is America. Mr Netanyahu enjoys a close personal relationship with US President Donald Trump, who publicly endorsed him during the campaign. That can sustain security and diplomatic cooperation. It also exposes the alliance to American domestic politics and to quarrels over escalation.

Mr Eisenkot might try to make the relationship more institutional and less personal. Mr Trump’s backing for Mr Netanyahu would complicate that. His hard line on security threats, though, could keep cooperation close even if the tone changed. Washington’s approach would also depend on American priorities, not only Israeli ones.

What Europe can expect

Beth Oppenheim, a policy fellow at the European Council for Foreign Relations, offers a sobering reading. “Israel’s hard-right shift goes far beyond the prime minister, and Europeans should prepare for more continuity than they would like,” she wrote just before the election.

Coalition arithmetic reinforces her point. Even a leader inclined towards a reset—and Mr Eisenkot may be one—would have to bargain with partners who could limit what his government changes. The roughly 20 seats still to be decided will shape how much room he would have.

Over the next three years, a continuing Netanyahu government would mean continuity in Israel’s strategic direction and in its disputes with the EU. Security cooperation would probably persist. Pressure from Brussels, and disagreement among national capitals over defence ties, could grow if the conflicts over Gaza and the West Bank continue. The choices will decide whether Israel’s voters have delivered a reset or merely a new tone.

Governments in Tehran, Washington, Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing have pushed a new world order. It consists in a simple approach: ditching any and all rules whenever it benefits them. Mr Netanyahu appears ever keener on joining the axis of thuggery. “It is either me and Trump or Eisenkot and Abbas,” he said during the campaign.

On Tuesday, Israelis had their chance to support or deny their prime minister such a course of action. They did not; possibly, like over 3000 years ago, because of their broken spirit and their cruel bondage. Their offspring might; after all, the journey never ends.