Russian maritime forces have left the Mediterranean for the North, mostly to protect the country’s shadow fleet. Meanwhile, EU sanctions on illegal tankers add pressure, but no boarding powers.

For two months this year, no Russian warship sailed the Mediterranean. A NATO official told Breaking Defense that the lull ran until early September. “The last time we saw a lack of any Russian presence there, specifically grey hulls or naval military vessels, was in 2016,” the official said. Separate reporting put the empty stretch between July and early September. Moscow’s ships, in effect, had gone elsewhere.

The vessels have not vanished from European seas. They have moved north. Britain’s Royal Navy counted a 25 per cent jump in its monitoring of Russian activity in the first seven months of 2026, against the same months of 2025.

The two trends are linked. Even a navy stretched thin—as Russia’s now is—can still impose costs on others. NATO’s answer has been measured so far. It has worked, but it needs sharpening.  

A base lost

Start in the south. Tartus was Russia’s main Mediterranean support point, allowing port calls, logistics, and a lasting presence. Russia pulled much of its forces from it in early 2025, after Syria’s government changed. Ships kept stopping there as a staging point, but the terms of access stayed unsettled.

Syria’s incoming government then cancelled the lease, which hurt Moscow’s reach to a nearby replenishment base. An August deal, however, lets Russian and Syrian forces use Tartus and the Hmeimim air base as joint training centres, according to the Associated Press. Ships appeared at the port in spring and early summer. By mid-year, however, Moscow was struggling to keep up its presence.

This is our core business. We will continue these sorts of operations, working alongside NATO allies, over the next few months. — Cmdr Oli Ayers, HMS St Albans

The ships themselves are not the issue. Reports name the corvette Stoykiy, the frigate Admiral Kasatonov, the submarine Krasnodar, and the replenishment vessel Neustrashimy stops Moscow rotating Black Sea Fleet vessels into the Mediterranean as a matter of routine. The longer route around Europe piles on logistical demands.

Changing priorities

Escort work drains hulls too. NATO sees a trend of Russian warships accompanying merchant ships through the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean. “These escorting activities take up valuable days at sea for the Russian Navy, and it places strain on their ability to generate naval forces for other missions,” said Basil Germond, a professor of international security at Lancaster University.

The security expert reads the same pattern as a change of priorities. He argues that a limited pool of surface warships is increasingly being turned to guarding valuable merchant vessels, shadow-fleet ships among them. Fewer hulls are therefore free for a lasting Mediterranean presence. Moscow appears to have chosen its tankers over its squadron.

Federico Borsari, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, agrees with NATO’s reading but looks deeper. He sees a navy in progressive decline, partly from attrition in the war in Ukraine. Mr Borsari says availability problems fall almost entirely on the Black Sea Fleet. The other fleets, he adds, are almost untouched.

Thin, not absent

That helps explain the north. Russia’s other fleets can still send individual warships through the Channel and the North Sea. A navy can be weak in one sea and busy in another. Thinness is partly a matter of distribution, not just of decline.

The Channel remains a corridor between the Baltic and the Atlantic. Russian destroyers, frigates, and corvettes pass through, often alongside tankers. The Royal Navy says the frigate Neustrashimy repeatedly crossed its area while escorting shadow-fleet tankers, (e.g., the Vulkan, now notorious because of the incident). British patrol vessels tracked each leg and passed the task on.

The Royal Navy maintains a persistent watch on activity around the UK, and this operation demonstrated our readiness to respond whenever required. — Cmdr James Mitchell, HMS Duncan

Italy offers the southern equivalent. Its navy, under Operation Mediterraneo Sicuro, watched Russian naval and shadow-fleet activity near Sardinia in early 2026. The episode shows allies paying heed to warships and sanctions-linked shipping at once.

NATO’s reply has been calibrated. Allies observe, track, share intelligence, and signal readiness. They do not treat every transit as an imminent military threat. Nothing in the record points to a continuous naval crisis or an armed clash in either sea. The friction, though, is constant.

The northern relay

The relay began in earnest in October 2025. NATO Allied Maritime Command tasked HMS Duncan to shadow the destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov through British waters and the Channel. The Royal Navy said no British warship had before worked under direct alliance command on such a task. A Wildcat helicopter and French and Dutch assets lent a hand.

Late 2025 brought more of the same. British forces followed the intelligence-gathering ship Yantar near undersea-cable routes. They also watched the submarine Krasnodar through a Channel transit. These tasks formed part of a standing effort to track Russian movements, not a single stand-off.

In January, HMS Mersey and HMS Severn, backed by a Wildcat helicopter, followed the corvette Boikiy and the tanker General Skobelev up the Channel and into the North Sea. British ships took over from allies who had watched the pair in the Bay of Biscay. They later passed the job to another ally.

August saw a three-day operation. HMS Duncan, HMS St Albans, and HMS Severn, with a Merlin helicopter, trailed the destroyer Admiral Levchenko and sanctioned cargo ships through the North Sea and the Channel. France, another NATO ally, took over off its coast. The design is clear: each state covers its own stretch.

Britain’s case

The UK says the effort is biting. First Sea Lord Gen Sir Gwyn Jenkins points to a change in Russian behaviour. “Since that successful operation, we have seen Russian shadow fleet vessels increasingly forced to change their routes, imposing significant cost and delays to their journeys,” he said.

Mr Jenkins also claims a strategic gain. “Alongside our allies, this approach is forcing Moscow to divert Russian warships away from their core purpose,” he said. He then added a warning. “That is because Russia knows we stand ready to act again, should it be required.”

Escorting activities take up valuable days at sea for the Russian Navy. — Basil Germond, Lancaster University

Mr Jenkins called the shadow fleet an unacceptable risk to British security and saw no room for complacency. In June, the UK acted on that logic. It interdicted the sanctioned tanker Smyrtos in the Channel, with military and law-enforcement support. Tracking a lawful transit is one thing; enforcing sanctions on commercial shipping is another.

Submarines drew attention too. In April, the UK defence secretary described a joint effort. “A Royal Navy warship and Royal Air Force P8 aircraft, alongside Allies’, ensured the Russian submarines were monitored 24/7,” the defence secretary said. Allies, in other words, shared the watch.

The commanders’ view

Commanders call the work routine. Cmdr Oli Ayers, commanding officer of HMS St Albans, described his frigate’s role in the NATO group. “As the Royal Navy’s very high readiness frigate, this is our core business. We will continue these sorts of operations, working alongside NATO allies, over the next few months,” he said.

Cmdr James Mitchell, commanding officer of HMS Duncan, struck a similar note. “The Royal Navy maintains a persistent watch on activity around the UK, and this operation demonstrated our readiness to respond whenever required,” he said. Mr Mitchell added that the watch was routine, yet it still demanded sustained surveillance and coordination.

Smaller ships ease the load. Lt Cmdr Sam Fields, commanding officer of HMS Tyne, said: “Through sustained presence and close cooperation with allies, HMS Tyne was ideally suited to this task, providing reassurance and monitoring while enabling other Fleet units to continue their operational commitments.”

Cmdr Matt Millyard, commanding officer of HMS Somerset, framed the mission more broadly. “This deployment demonstrates exactly what the Royal Navy exists to do, protect the UK and our allies from wherever our interests are threatened,” he said. The Royal Navy has put patrol ships, frigates, destroyers, and aircraft to sea to meet rising demand.

What NATO can do

An April, 2026 speech by John Healey, then-defence secretary, carried a sharper point about deterrence. “Our Armed Forces left them with no doubt that they were being monitored, that their movements were not covert as President Putin planned and that their attempted secret operations had been exposed,” Mr Healey said. Exposure is itself a weapon.

Possible remedies include several interconnected steps. First, make the relay permanent. Handovers from the Bay of Biscay to the North Sea worked. HMS Duncan’s tasking under NATO command should become routine, with clear allied responsibility for each stretch of the route. Standing rules would close gaps, and spare crews the need to improvise.

We have seen Russian shadow fleet vessels increasingly forced to change their routes, imposing significant cost and delays to their journeys. — Gen Sir Gwyn Jenkins, Britain’s First Sea Lord

Second, build enforcement capacity across the alliance. Escorts tie down Russian frigates, and interdictions raise the cost of every voyage. The Smyrtos case shows that military and law-enforcement tools can work together. More allies can copy it. Watching a tanker is cheap for Moscow to endure. Stopping one is not.

Third, do not misread the south. The Tartus training deal could bring Russian ships back. Mr Germond warns against taking the gap for a withdrawal. “In the longer term, however, Russia retains both the strategic interest and the residual capability to send warships into the Mediterranean — the current situation is neither a permanent shift nor a temporary anomaly; it is an outcome of the strategic and operational reality facing the Russian Navy,” he said. NATO should read the gap as strain, not retreat.

Where Brussels stands

EU rules on Russia’s shadow fleet rest on targeted sanctions, not a general ban. More than 670 vessels are listed under the 20th and 21st packages. Listed ships face port-access bans, and EU operators may not provide them with services. Since the 21st package, ships that bunker or refuel sanctioned vessels can be listed.

Boarding is murkier. No general EU right to board foreign-flagged tankers merely on suspicion has been established. The 21st package does let member states confiscate and sell cargo from shadow-fleet vessels they lawfully detain. Any boarding therefore needs another basis, such as flag-state consent, port-state jurisdiction, or a specific sanctions-enforcement measure.

A broader ban is still pending. The 20th package created a legal basis for prohibiting maritime services tied to Russian crude and petroleum products, including chartering, broking, financing, and insurance. By the time of writing, it had not been activated; the Council is to decide after consulting the G7 and allowing a wind-down. Until then, unlisted suspect tankers are not automatically caught, allowing Vladimir Putin’s regime to escape unscathed.