The European Council sharpened its sanctions regime against Russian figures and institutions who deport, transfer, indoctrinate, and militarise Ukrainian children. On 11 May, it added sixteen officials and seven organisations to the bloc’s blacklist. The same afternoon the message enjoyed wide support from the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children’s Brussels meeting.
According to the Council, the newly listed people and bodies “run pro-Russian indoctrination, including through patriotic events, ideological education, and military-oriented activities”. Assets in Europe are frozen, EU citizens and companies may not supply funds, and the individuals face an immediate travel ban. The measure amends Regulation 269/2014.
Brussels timed the move to coincide with the high-level meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Moscow has “deported and forcibly transferred nearly 20,500 Ukrainian children”. The Council calls these deportations “grave breaches of international law” that aim to erase Ukrainian identity and undermine Ukraine’s future.
A wider net
Sanctions remain the Union’s preferred tool. In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council declared that “efforts to further limit Russia’s ability to wage war must continue”. On 13 March 2026, 25 heads of state or government renewed “its urgent call on Russia and Belarus to immediately ensure the safe and unconditional return to Ukraine of all unlawfully deported and transferred Ukrainian children and other civilians”. Today’s listings translate that promise into action.
Previous rounds targeted Kremlin grandees and their financiers. The new package reaches further down the chain, spotlighting camp directors, children’s-rights commissioners, and youth-club bosses. Brussels believes that hitting these mid-level enablers will disrupt the logistics of deportation and indoctrination.
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Legal underpinning is firm, as Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union permits unanimous foreign-policy sanctions. The Council documented each individual act, from signing guardianship papers to running rifle practice.
Three federal children’s centres—Orlyonok, Scarlet Sails, and Smena—anchor the entity list. Each works with Russia’s education ministry to host Ukrainian minors and immerse them in ‘patriotic’ schooling. Paramilitary outfits play their part: DOSAAF’s Sevastopol branch and the Military-Patriotic Club ‘Patriot’ train teenagers with rifles and drills. The Nakhimov Naval School funnels the keenest into naval cadet courses. Together these institutions form the backbone of what the Council calls a “systematic unlawful deportation, forced transfer, forced assimilation” campaign.
Counting the cost
Local officials grease the machinery. Children’s-rights commissioners in Astrakhan and Murmansk arrange adoptions in Russian families. Occupation-authority figures in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Sevastopol craft curricula that replace Ukrainian heritage with Kremlin myths. Camp chiefs from Berdyansk to Crimea supervise everything from ideological lectures to weapons handling. Each now finds credit cards blocked and holidays in Europe impossible.
Brussels argues that sanctions work by raising transaction costs. Frozen property in Spain or Cyprus hurts privately, even if the Kremlin reimburses public losses. Travel bans deny listed figures the prestige of Western conferences and the chance to court donors for their camps. Cutting access to European suppliers forces the organisations to scramble for replacement kit—from sports gear to kitchen equipment—at a time when Russia’s own budget strains under war costs.
Kyiv welcomes the escalation yet presses for more. Officials seek to target transport firms and financial intermediaries that move children and launder funds. EU diplomats say the file stays open: intelligence gathered at the Coalition meeting could yield fresh names and entities for the next Council session. That steady drip, they insist, keeps pressure on Moscow while avoiding sudden escalation.
Compliance and enforcement
The Kremlin dismisses sanctions as futile. Still, nervous mid-tier officials now weigh the personal risk of participating in child transfers. Brussels hopes that calculation, multiplied across regions, will gum up the deportation machinery. Diplomats concede that sanctions alone cannot bring children home; they can, however, degrade the system that spirits them away.
Member-state authorities began screening banking systems as soon as the names appeared in the Official Journal. Property registries flag real-estate holdings, and customs offices watch for attempts to ship luxury goods. The Council warns that assisting a listed entity—or even failing to freeze funds—invites hefty national penalties. Previous rounds saw yachts impounded and brokerage accounts locked; today’s targets can expect similar treatment.
The Union designed the listings to survive legal challenge. Each entry cites specific conduct: running camps, drafting adoption laws, commanding paramilitary drills. Courts in Luxembourg demand such granularity before upholding asset freezes. By focusing on documented acts—rather than broad political affiliation—the Council aims to defend the measure against inevitable appeals.
Rising prices
European leaders meet again in June to assess compliance and consider further measures. Much depends on Russia’s battlefield fortunes and its willingness to negotiate. For now, the Union signals that every deported child carries a price rising with each fresh sanction round.
The push against the evil practice finds supporters even inside Russia, a country deeply split by attitudes to Vladimir Putin and his policies, to Ukraine, and to the war. The Platform for dialogue with Russian democratic forces, established in January—having recruited its delegates from the ranks of Russia’s opposition, internal or exiled—at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, lists the return of Ukrainian children to their homes as one of its priorities.
Blacklisted individuals
• Lilya V. Shvetsova — head of Red Carnation camp, Berdyansk; runs ideological and military-patriotic programmes for Ukrainian minors
• Elena V. Romanovskaya — deputy prime minister of Crimea and labour and social-protection minister; uses Artek camp network to indoctrinate deported children
• Andrey P. Sabinov — Kherson “Regional Duma” deputy and head of Warrior centre; organises paramilitary and propaganda training for minors
• Aleksandra A. Bondareva — children’s-rights ombudsman, Astrakhan oblast; places deported Ukrainian minors in Russian families
• Alevtina V. Andreeva — children’s-rights commissioner, Murmansk region; oversees reception and ideological integration of transferred children
• Alina S. Nikishaeva — head of Simferopol club Battalion Forpost; provides military-patriotic training
• Igor V. Zhuravlev — director, All-Russian Children’s Centre Smena; hosts Ukrainian children for Russification and cadet schooling
• Andranik S. Gasparyan — colonel and commander of youth centre Warrior; directs large-scale military-patriotic programmes
• Igor Vorobyov — head of Warrior branch, Volgograd; regional organiser of training
• Egor A. Logunov — ‘minister of youth policy’, occupied Zaporizhzhia; writes indoctrination curricula
• Marina Y. Slonchenko — head of Sevastopol youth department; runs propaganda events
• Natalya D. Shevchuk — chief of DOSAAF Sevastopol; militarises children via shooting clubs and drills
• Evgeniya A. Grichenkova — director of Artek camp Korsun; oversees Russification programmes
• Dmitriy E. Shevchenko — head of Warrior centre, former education official in Luhansk; blends schooling with weapons handling
• Aleksey S. Zinchenko — chair of Crimean youth-policy committee; expands military-patriotic schooling
• Anastasia P. Akkuratova — deputy director, Russian Education Ministry (child-rights); rewrote guardianship rules for adoptions
Blacklisted entities
• All-Russian Children’s Centre Smena — main hub for hosting and indoctrinating deported children
• Avangard Military Camp — summer courses mixing weapons training with propaganda
• DOSAAF Sevastopol — paramilitary club network giving minors rifle practice and ideology drills
• Military-Patriotic Club ‘Patriot’ — youth militia activities akin to DOSAAF
• Nakhimov Naval School — naval cadet academy enrolling deported children
• All-Russian Children’s Centre Orlyonok — coastal camp integrating minors into ‘patriotic’ education
• All-Russian Children’s Centre Scarlet Sails — sister camp to Orlyonok with identical agenda
Broad coalition for Ukraine’s children
In a similar vein, the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children met in Brussels on Monday. The joint organisers—the European Union, Ukraine, and Canada—welcomed representatives of 60 countries (mostly foreign ministers or their deputies) and organisations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s video kicked off the session. He implored the diplomats to keep the pressure on Russia intense: “Sanctions are working,” he said.
The EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, who presided over much of the debate, mentioned a talk she had had with her son on the topic. “Yesterday was Mother’s Day and I had a discussion with my son who is 14 years old. So I told him that there are 20,000 children who have been taken from their homes and deported. And he said to me, in my school there are thousand children. So that means 20 schools full of children.”
Sorry for being frank, but all of these exhibitions, events and meetings have absolutely zero meaning if they don’t bring measurable results. — Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister
Ms Kallas reiterated the EU position on the matter — that it is Russian government policy, approved by Vladimir Putin himself, to erase the identity of Ukraine. She mentioned that in 2023, the International Criminal Court issued two arrest warrants (for Vladimir Putin and Maria Belova) for war crimes in connection to the unlawful transfers of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.
The High Repreentative then listed the Union’s achievements countering the atrocious policy. “Since October last year alone, we have given five million euro for psychosocial support centres for war-affected children and families, two million euro for the care of returned children, 1.75 million euro for accountability, accountability efforts for crimes related to deportations,” she said.
A five-step solution
Andrii Sybiha, Foreign Minister of Ukraine had a blunt message. He mentioned an exhibition called Empty Beds, a “deeply emotional and disturbing experience for us in Ukraine. (…) It’s a horrible reality of stolen children.”
“And sorry for being frank, but all of these exhibitions, events and meetings have absolutely zero meaning if they don’t bring measurable results. (…) We have managed to return over 2,000 kids, but this was done not thanks to international mechanism, but rather despite their failure. When we talk about children being really returned, certain countries help, such as Qatar, the US and the Holy See, some others, including those present in the room, our special services and state institutions worked. But today we need to be asking ourselves, what concrete actions are we taking to return children?”
Mr Sybiha went on to sketch a five-point plan of how the international coalition should transform into an effective mechanism for the actual return of children. “It is critical for us. One — develop a concrete roadmap of action for the coalition members outlining their commitments and measures to be taken. Two — continue to support practical initiatives on tracing returns, reintegrations and accountability. Three — implement the resolution through the UN Secretary General’s actions. Four — impose new tough sanctions on those responsible for abductions and deportations of Ukrainian children. Fove — enforce the ICCRS warrants issued against Putin and Belova.”
Each of the delegations then enjoyed two minutes of the conference’s undivided attention. The meeting thus heard over fifty times that their country/institution stands firmly against abducting children, that what Russia is doing must stop, and that words are not enough.
