For years, Europe’s energy security debate centred on Russian gas. Today, the challenge is no longer just how to replace Russian fossil fuels, but how to avoid creating new strategic dependencies in the process. That is the warning from Gonzalo Escribano, senior fellow and director of the Energy and Climate Programme at the Elcano Royal Institute.
Escribano first began viewing energy as a geopolitical issue when his home country, Spain, experienced shortages during Algeria’s civil war in the 1990s. At a time when energy policy was still largely viewed through an economic lens, the crisis showed how political instability beyond Europe’s borders could quickly affect everyday life at home — a lesson Europe would relearn during the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
“We have to be careful not to depend too much on US LNG.”
— Gonzalo Escribano
In an interview with EU Perspectives, Escribano argues that while the European Union has made significant progress in reducing its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the next phase of the energy transition brings new geopolitical challenges. As Europe electrifies its economy, it must balance strategic autonomy with openness to trusted international partners, avoiding excessive reliance on either US LNG or Chinese clean-energy supply chains.
Europe has moved away from Russian oil and gas. Is there a risk it is simply exchanging one dependency for another by relying more heavily on the US?
We have to be careful not to depend too much on US LNG. The US has been very important in helping Europe get out of trouble during the Russian crisis, and I am not saying that we have to cut LNG imports from the US. We need them, especially because we are phasing out Russian gas. But we are dealing with a US that is not what it used to be.
The current US leadership is not as predictable, and when you read the US national security strategy, it says the country is ready to leverage its energy dominance strategies in its dealings with both allies and rivals. That is a very significant message for the bloc. The EU’s strategic autonomy therefore also depends on partners that may not remain friendly forever.
Brussels increasingly talks about producing more technologies in Europe to strengthen its strategic autonomy. Is the EU becoming too protectionist?
I think we should build open relationships with trusted partners. We have free trade agreements with countries such as Chile, Mexico and Morocco, and negotiations with others. These countries can make an important contribution to Europe’s decarbonisation. Morocco, for example, has huge renewable energy potential, produces fertilisers and has cobalt reserves.
But what we cannot do is say: ‘Yes, we want your renewable electricity, your hydrogen, your cobalt and your lithium, but we do not want you to participate in our value chain.’ I think we have to try to balance this “made in Europe” idea without alienating those partners. They may not share all our political, democratic or human rights values, but they are our economic partners and allies.
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“Europe simply does not have enough lithium or cobalt to become fully self-sufficient, so the challenge is reducing that dependency without trying to produce everything at home.”
— Gonzalo Escribano
So these partners are essential for the EU’s decarbonization goals?
I think so. I’m not naive. I’m not saying that that’s the whole solution. We also need to strengthen the European value chain through a smart mix of industrial policy, trade policy and local production. At a time when multilateral cooperation with the current US administration is becoming more difficult, Europe has to deepen its relationships with middle powers and smaller countries that are willing to work with us.
How should the EU deal with new dependencies that the clean-energy transition might create, especially regarding China?
China dominates many clean-energy value chains, from batteries to refined lithium and other critical raw materials. Europe simply does not have enough lithium or cobalt to become fully self-sufficient, so the challenge is reducing that dependency without trying to produce everything at home.
One risk EU policymakers may be underestimating is the fragmentation of clean energy value chains. I fully agree that we need to defend ourselves from excessive dependence on China. However, if we place too much emphasis on local production and adopt a “fortress Europe” approach, it will be very costly.
You have argued that the old energy trilemma between security, affordability and sustainability is changing. Why?
For the EU, I think this trade-off has been greatly exaggerated. We do not have significant oil and gas resources, so we cannot compete with the US on oil and gas prices. And we cannot compete with China on reducing environmental standards. So we have to follow our own path. And for good or for bad, we need to develop renewable energies because we don’t have any alternatives.
Even imported renewable energy technologies provide more strategic autonomy than oil and gas. Solar is now the cheapest source of electricity by historical standards. It is also more secure, in the sense that electricity is generated locally. Although we have to import some of the devices, such as solar panels, once they are installed they generate electricity locally for 25, 30 or even 35 years.
Do you believe that the EU has to be more realistic about the geopolitical challenges of the energy transition?
The EU has lost some of its normative innocence: the idea that we would lead on decarbonisation and everyone else would simply follow our green model. Let’s not be naive on that but also let’s not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Over the coming decades, we will still have to manage the risks of the fossil fuel era: oil and gas trade, difficult suppliers and attempts to use energy as a geopolitical tool. At the same time, we will face a set of new risks associated with the renewable energy transition: critical minerals, China’s dominance and fragmented value chains. That makes the situation more complex, but the path is still clear. We need renewables, electrification, infrastructure and strategic partnerships.
