Russia was supposed to buckle under the weight of Western sanctions. It didn’t. Four years into the war, its economy is still running and its war machine still grinding forward — but cracks are beginning to show. The real question for Europe is no longer whether Russia can endure, but for how long and at what cost.
At a joint meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) with delegations on EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations, experts and lawmakers painted a picture of a system under pressure but still far from collapse. The discussion moved beyond headlines about ‘resilience’ to examine the deeper mechanics of Russia’s war economy, its recruitment model, and the political logic sustaining the conflict with a clear warning: time alone will not end the war but sustained pressure might.
Focusing on the battlefield, Joris van Bladel, Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, described the conflict as a classic war of attrition. “It is the comparison between how many people are killed and how many people you can recruit,” he said, calling it “a tragic humanitarian calculation”.
We are now into the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Clearly we can see many signs that resource depletion is becoming very, very visible. That resilience miracle is clearly largely over. — Vladimir Milov, Vice President of the Free Russia Foundation
Mr van Bladel estimates that more than 300,000 Russian soldiers have died, including a significant number of poorly trained recruits. “Russia is fighting this war with a mass army… people who are not fully trained for a modern war.” Particularly concerning is the loss of junior officers, who are essential for battlefield leadership.
The limits of endurance
Mr Van Bladel warns that the EU must be aware of its own cultural bias: “Interpreting Russia through Western assumptions is not a good way to understand the Russian way of warfare.” High casualties, he argued, do not automatically translate into political constraints. The system frames sacrifice as a source of legitimacy.
Offering a complementary perspective, Ekaterina Schulmann, Non-Resident Scholar at the Carnegie Russia/Eurasia Center, cautioned against drawing immediate conclusions about Russia’s ability to continue the war. She emphasised that “in the immediate present, there are still enough resources to wage the war, no matter how unsuccessful”.
You might be interested
In Ms Schulmann’s view, authoritarian systems can prolong costly conflicts because they lack electoral accountability — “This is one of the privileges of an autocracy.” Moreover, Russia moved from the initial shock of 2022 to adaptation and normalization of war by 2024.
But 2025 marked a turning point. “The preservation of this illusion of normality started to erode,” she said, pointing to rising taxes, increasing pressure on small businesses, and growing repression within the elite. “The system started to eat itself: we see signs that show the approach to administrative dysfunction.” She drew cautious parallels with the late Soviet period.
Behind the ‘resilience’ narrative
Vladimir Milov, Vice President of the Free Russia Foundation, challenged what he called a misleading narrative of Russian economic strength. “We are now into the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Clearly we can see many signs that resource depletion is becoming very, very visible,” he said. He pointed to a looming 10 per cent cut in federal spending, a budget deficit close to three per cent of GDP, and borrowing costs reaching 15 per cent.
It’s not about Ukraine, it’s about Europe. It’s not about money, we can afford this. It’s about political will. — MEP Pekka Toveri (EPP/SUO), Chair of the Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee
Inflation ranks among the highest in the G20, and unsustainable fiscal stimulus drove the apparent growth of previous years. “That resilience miracle is clearly largely over,” Mr Milov added. According to him, Russia has exhausted much of its financial reserves. GDP growth slowed to around one per cent, and early 2026 is already showing signs of contraction.
Mr Milov also dismissed expectations of external support. He noted that “There have been no investment inflows from China to Russia in the past four years,” while military-industrial output is now declining. “Russia is not in a position to wage war perpetually. Its resources are dwindling and pressure works. More pressure is needed,” he said in the EU chamber.
Need of political will, not money
Turning to the European perspective, MEP Ville Niinistö (Greens-EFA/SUO), Chair of the Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, stressed the need for sustained Western resolve. “Russia is in this for the long haul. Putin is counting on Western democracies becoming weak,” Mr Niinistö warned. He pointed to estimates that up to 10 per cent of Russia’s GDP and half of its state budget are now devoted to military spending. While acknowledging this level of militarisation as unsustainable, he argued it reinforces the urgency of maintaining sanctions pressure.
MEP Pekka Toveri (EPP/SUO), Chair of the Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee, issued a stark warning, stressing that the conflict with Russia “is not about Ukraine, it’s about Europe”. He argued that Russia’s strategic objectives remain unchanged, and that insufficient support to Kyiv risks wider instability.
“It’s not about money, we can afford this. It’s about political will,” he said, noting that EU spending for Ukraine remains significantly below past crisis responses. Mr Toveri concluded by calling for tougher sanctions—including against third countries enabling circumvention—and rejected any talk of normalisation relations with Moscow.
For Brussels, Russia can still fight, but the cost is mounting and the strain is beginning to show. What remains uncertain is not Moscow’s capacity to endure, but Europe’s willingness—and ability—to outlast it.
