As shutdowns spread, Europe faces a pointed question: how difficult would it be to take its own networks off the internet?
Somebody flicks a switch, and like that, an entire country goes offline. That is not a hypothetical. Currently, 11 countries face internet shutdowns. From Iran and Gaza to Ukraine, authorities are increasingly disrupting access during conflict. Civil organisations warn that the restrictions obstruct journalism, access to essential services, and the documentation of human rights violations.
Europe is still far from being a global centre for shutdowns. Surfshark, a subscription-based cybersecurity service identified only 20 cases in Europe since 2015. Russia accounts for 65 per cent and Belarus for another 20 per cent (leaving the rest of the continent with mere three cases over the decade). Thirty-nine of the 44 European countries it assesses have no recorded disruption. But the trend elsewhere is hard to ignore.
The scale of the problem
In 2025, at least 313 shutdowns occurred in 52 countries — more than in either 2024 or 2023. Conflict was the leading trigger for the third consecutive year, accounting for 40 per cent of the global total. The US non-profit Internet Society recorded 75 total or partial shutdowns across 10 countries over the past year, and affected populations suffered 17,900 man-hours of deliberate disconnection.
Access Now, a New York-based non-profit argues that connectivity disruptions can conceal evidence of atrocities and, in some circumstances, facilitate them. It points to a 2025 International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor policy recognising that shutdowns may contribute to international crimes. Seventy of the 2025 shutdowns coincided with grave human rights abuses in 21 countries.
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UNESCO warned earlier this year that governments were increasingly resorting to shutdowns during political crises. The worry is that citizens lose access to information precisely when it matters most. Just this week, a coalition of civil society organisations including ARTICLE 19 called on Pakistan to lift restrictions that have left parts of the country without internet access since June. While broadband was partially restored at the end of July, mobile data remained disrupted.
How does a shutdown work? Authorities can order mobile operators to stop providing data, throttle connections until they become practically unusable, block individual communication platforms, or interfere with routing. During conflicts, connectivity can also disappear through attacks on telecommunications infrastructure, cyberattacks, or the jamming and confiscation of satellite equipment.
Three ways of going dark
Iranian authorities imposed a shutdown as protests were violently suppressed at the beginning of 2026. As regional conflict intensified, the restrictions became broader and longer-lasting. Tehran has also targeted alternatives to the domestic network. After the 12-day Iran-Israel war in 2025, authorities criminalised unauthorised internet tools such as Starlink.
In March, the Council sanctioned the head of Tehran’s cyber police, saying the body played a central role in filtering the internet, censoring content, and controlling social media. EU restrictions also prohibit exports to Iran of equipment that can be used to monitor telecommunications. MEP Hannah Neumann (Greens-EFA/DEU) has asked whether the EU would increase support for circumvention tools, secure communications infrastructure, and technologies capable of keeping Iranian citizens connected during shutdowns.
In Ukraine, most disconnections result from attacks on the infrastructure on which the internet depends. According to Access Now, at least three sets of Russian missile strikes hit Ukrainian energy infrastructure in 2025. The digital front also ran in the opposite direction, with Ukrainian hackers blamed for cyberattacks that disrupted two major Russian internet providers in Moscow and St Petersburg. In Palestine, many local internet providers have been offline since the beginning of the war in 2023. Telecommunications repeatedly disappeared as a result of military operations and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.
Could the EU be switched off?
Internet blackouts have moved into EU foreign policy. Brussels says it supports a “free, open and secure internet” and uses diplomatic and human-rights dialogues to condemn government-organised shutdowns and censorship. It also finances digital protection for human-rights defenders, including access to devices and VPNs.
There is no general power in EU telecom rules allowing providers to simply disconnect users. The EU’s Open Internet Regulation requires providers to treat traffic equally and prohibits blocking, slowing, or restricting services, subject to narrowly defined exceptions. Measures can be taken to comply with lawful orders, protect the security and integrity of networks, or manage exceptional and temporary congestion. They must be necessary and proportionate.
That does not mean an internet shutdown inside Europe is technically impossible. National security remains primarily the responsibility of individual member states. NIS2 requires providers of public electronic communications networks to manage cybersecurity risks and report major incidents. The legislation points to the need to protect communications networks against sabotage, espionage, and threats to undersea communications cables. The gap between legal safeguards and technical vulnerability remains worth watching.
